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Contents

Introduction

According to most science-based definitions (the Arctic circle, the treeline, the existence of permafrost, etc.) the European Subarctic consists roughly in the northernmost counties of Norway, Sweden and Finland, and in northern Russia, west of the Urals: the counties of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, and the *Nenets Autonomous Okrug*. North-West Russian tourism is often routed via Moscow or Saint Petersburg and linked to tourist operators in the adjacent southern Republics of Komi and Karelia. Taken together this "north" overlaps with most of the socio-political partnership, launched in 1993, called the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. Given that this region is sparsely populated by most standards and strikes a majority of visitors from the south as a desolate polar "wilderness," it is still the most populated part of the circumpolar north.

Since ancient times its coastal villages have served as base-camps for seal-hunters, whalers, explorers, and later on for military personnel, all with ambitions and sometimes abilities to travel far north into what was found to be a wide, mostly sea-ice-cowered ocean with a small number of islands distributed close to its coast. Apart from indigenous hunting and reindeer husbandry, until recently, the reasons to reside permanently inland of the European Subarctic have been basically two; in its southern part: forestry, and there as well as on the tundra further north: mining of minerals and extraction of fossil fuels. The exploitation of the mineral riches of the European north has resulted in a number of mining and metallurgical mono towns ridden by the boom-and-bust cycles of the global economy. The start-up phase in the 1930s of Arctic mining in Russia and the way it was conducted during Stalin's reign produced human hardship and presented many challenges also to the Soviet planned economy.[1]

Today tourism in northern Norway is in a period of growth. In Finland Subarctic tourism is of substantial economic importance since several decades due to a concerted national effort combining cutting edge academic knowledge of tourism with hospitality talent and entrepreneurship supported by visionary investors. Helped by international media attention of late, and the coming of efficient medication against motion sickness, the initially domestically motivated and for most passenger sea-wise quite demanding Norwegian costal express of *Hurtigruten* has turned into a successful upper segment medium distance cruising business. To it comforts and vistas of

[1] U. Wråkberg, "Science and industry in northern Russia in Scandinavian perspective," in S. Sörlin, ed., *Science, geopolitics and culture in the Polar region – Norden beyond borders.* Farnham: Ashgate, , 2013, pp. 195–223; L. Elenius, H. Tjelmeland, M. Lähteenmäki & A. Golubev eds, *The Barents region: a transnational history of Subarctic Northern Europe*. Oslo: Pax forlag, 2015.

beautiful fjords while sailing along the coast, tourist events are on offer, mainly as short outings, but also as a brief program during an extra field day or two for those willing to stop-over, by local operators at the harbor towns where the thirteen ships of the *Hurtigruten* call on their route from Bergen to Kirkenes and back.

Many of these local tourist attractions are nature-based. Some add little new to the fascination, propagated since the nineteenth century in the travelogues of educated West and Central European travelers of various scientific inclination, for Arctic exotica and the sublime attraction of a harsh nature with odd natural phenomena, foremost among which are the Aurora, and the enigmatic ways of life and traditional knowledge of the Sami indigenous people. The Western alarmism of global warming is a recent addition however which has made winter itself seem destined towards extinction and worth experiencing before it retreats from areas accessible to any tourists other than those possessing extraordinary purchasing power. In Norway neoliberal politicians have vested all relevant departments of the university sector with the task of advising the national and local tourism industry on how to produce the most profitable tourism experiences imaginable for the lowest costs possible to the tax payers in terms of state funding to the university. In this endeavor research on the cultural aspects of tourism are so far mostly absent.

Issues to be probed in this policy paper:

- Is culture ingrained in the way we see nature?
- Does northern Europe exhibit traits in common with other so-called peripheral regions in e.g. Central or Eastern Europe where contact zones exist between the cultures and peoples of Europe and those of Eurasia and Asia Minor, or is the cultural geography of Subarctic Europe somehow as unique as its polar nature?
- Is the alarmist media image of Arctic nature under threat somehow mirrored in an equally gloomy view of the high north as a cold world of frontiers and conflicting claims, a likely scene of geopolitical struggle over latent resources and potential sea-links, with ramifications on the national security of all countries to its south?
- Is there a need to discuss and develop an ethical sustainability code for northern tourism management beside its often declared need of ecological sustainability?

As can be imagined the answer in this policy paper to all four of these questions will be yes. It will discuss whether certain issues characteristic and since long acknowledged in Central European border-regions are also to be found, or are significantly absent, in the Euro-Arctic. Northern Scandinavia and the adjacent part of Russia are supposed to form today a cross-border region very different from those of former Eastern Blok states in Central/

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics of the sovereign Baltic States – of which several today are both EU and NATO members. Finland and Sweden, in contrast to Norway, are EU member states while Norway, in contrast to both its northern Scandinavian neighbors, is a member of NATO. The possible reasons, despite all this, to look for similarities in the post-Soviet cultural challenges found at the center of Europe and in its north, and to consider their possible implication for good heritage and tourism management, include the following:

- the geographical position: the northern end of the Norwegian–Finnish–Russian border reaches the Barents Sea of the Arctic Ocean on the longitude of Istanbul;
- developments not only in the far-off north but also in many parts of Central Europe have been, and are still, characterized by long distances to centers of economic, administrative and political power;
- ancient religious borderlands between the Russian Orthodox and the Evangelical or Catholic Churches found in the north and in Central Europe are not just some of the many unmarked so-called phantom borders of Europe but of significance in contemporary politics and in heritage management, and thus of significance to the tourism industry;
- the Euro-Arctic has certain historical experiences in common with Central Europe like those of Second World with deportations and extensive infrastructural devastation, not denying that occupied Northern Norway and especially neutral Sweden, were spared significant portions of the horrors of war suffered elsewhere in Europe;
- comparing the rebuilding of housing and infrastructure after the Second World War in northern and central Europe we find some similarities but also significant differences in the policies applied of revival or suppression of older regional traditions in the post-war architecture and the new layout of urban and rural settlements;[2]
- the Iron Curtain of the Cold War shut the former borderlands of the Euro-Arctic down for trade and cultural exchange. Pre-war neighbors got divided not only geopolitically but also economically. This was detrimental to regional development;
- contemporary regional and local history of the eastern borderlands of Europe has identified many methodologically significant challenges which would motivate a comparison with what there is of historiographical experiences from similar work on the Subarctic

[2] U. Wråkberg, "The loss of built heritage in northern Norway during WWII and the failing interest to restore it in the official post-war rebuilding policy," in G. Zhigunova, ed., *Social development of Northern territories in Russia and foreign countries: experience, challenges, prospects.* Murmansk State Humanities University, Murmansk, 2015, pp. 257–62.

> border-regions. Central European and German historiographical debate has achieved significant headways in demonstrating how e.g. collective memory is formed, it has pointed out the need to speak about competing "writings of history,"[3] and to break with the old idea, still influential among amateurs, of finding and stating the conclusive Rankean master story on "history as it really was" (the scientific historicism that Leopold von Ranke has been credited/ criticized by posterity for founding, has itself, not surprisingly, been found in later scholarship, to be a reductionist interpretation of his own/real?/ endeavor as historian.[4]

In the following part, some issues of tourism and heritage management will be presented exemplified from the coastal landscape and borderland of the Curonian Spit, which connects Lithuania and Russia at is enclave of Kaliningrad on the shore of the Baltic Sea. Other observations will be made on the complex region of Transcarpathia, today mainly comprising the westernmost part of Ukraine.

It will be argued that a contextual, comparative and reflective understanding of cultural heritage should be applied also on Subarctic tourism, which is still often understood as somehow "given by nature." This is the way towards non-discriminatory northern heritage management, and a prerequisite for attaining ethically sustainable tourism operations in the high north. There is a need to be wary of lingering colonial connotation of concepts like "frontiers" and the "opening of territory" still often used e.g. in economic outlooks on northern Norway. Key geopolitical concepts like "delimitation lines" and "sectors" may need to be balanced with the use of more open but scholarly motivated concepts like "cross-roads," "collective memory" and "contested heritage" in balancing the simplistic attitudes and biased scenarios often presented regarding the present and likely future of the borderlands of Europe.

Based on participant observation during guided tours, and systematic study of public tourism information, it is possible to address what happens during "tourism in action:" which layers in the local cultural heritage are (made) visible, what interpretations are communicated and what conclusions drawn. Flexibilities in meanings may be built into narratives produced by guides themselves on site in the land-/city-/border-scape, and at local museums.[5] A host of un-provoked sources exists today on

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[3] M. Tamm, "Beyond history and memory: New perspectives in memory studies," *History Compass* 11(6), 2013, pp. 458–73; See also A. Erll, "Travelling memory," *Parallax* 17(4), 2011, pp. 4–18.

[4] R. Vierhaus, "Leopold von Ranke: Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Wissenschaft und Kunst," *Historische Zeitschrift* 244(2), 1987, pp. 285–98.

[5] On the concept of borderscape, see C. Brambilla, "Exploring the critical potential

the meanings of borderscapes, on travel-blogs, web- and Facebook-pages containing trip-advise, photos, comments and likings. Some of this has been consulted in the research for this chapter. Looking at a few cases of border-regions, the general aim has been to provide hints on why some ideas and memories and not others get reproduced in the discourses and enactments of guided tours of a region and how this effects the interpretations of its sites, monuments and spaces.

Borderland comparison I: the Curonian Spit

The Curonian Spit is an elongated, slightly curved peninsula, a narrow extension of land some 100 km in length and a width varying from 4km down to 400 meters at its most narrow point near the village of Lesnoye. It runs in a SSW-NNE direction and forms part of the coast of the Southeastern corner of the Baltic Sea in closing to its east the Curonian Lagoon. The lagoon is open to the Baltic Sea only at its northern end by a narrow sound to at the port of Klaipėda. The Spit consists mainly of sand and sand dunes, all mostly bound by pine woods and other vegetation. It has been the object of public governance policies since the nineteenth century aiming for nature conservation by systematic land-management. Interestingly the earliest policies also included instructions on the preservation of cultural heritage in the styles and building traditions of the (then still important) fishing villages on the Spit. The region was granted World heritage status in 2000. Its territory is divided roughly in half by the national border of the Republic of Lithuania and its 54 km northern section, and the Russian Federation exclave Kaliningradskaya Oblast in the south.

Based on what archaeology can tell about this part of Europe an open-air Viking village "Ancient Sambia" was opened to tourists in April 2014 in the Kaliningrad region and soon became a success.[6] Even if we set the scope to what written sources can tell about this borderland it presents a multifaceted history, under the sovereignty of Prussia, Imperial and later Soviet Russia and as part of Lithuania, to mention only the most durable regimes.

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of the borderscapes concept," *Geopolitics* 20(1), 2015, pp. 14–34.

6 A.V. Belova, E. G. Kropinova, "New forms of innovative tourism products as a result of the interaction of history, culture and tourism," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 6(6), 2015, pp. 41–5.

In medieval times the Spit and the towns to its south and north was ruled by the Teutonic and Livonian Orders. Klaipėda dates back to the fortress of Memelburg, later the town with the German name Memel, with large portions of its dweller of Jewish and Lithuanian culture and language. This German Order North–South axis tied together what was called in German Riga–Memel–Königsberg–Danzig (contemporary Riga in Latvia, Klaipėda in Lithuania, Kaliningrad in Russia and Gdansk in Poland). The town of Memel was for long the northern-most point of the German speaking world. Amidst the Curonian Lagoon flows the Memel River. The English name of this once commercially important river is Neman; in Lithuanian it is Nemunas.[7] It formed a cross-road with shipping routes along the coast, towards Belarus and nearby "hinterlands" which during different periods were under Polish, Russian and Lithuanian sovereignty. The economy of the coastal region developed as part of Prussia in the eighteenth century, but also saw some modernization when part of Imperial Russia.[8]

The German–Jewish–Lithuanian combinations of skills in city management, industrialism and business in and around Memel, esp. during the interwar period, made it stand out in terms of economic development compared to inland Lithuania to which it was annexed in 1923. In terms of historiography we should avoid the often applied use of the word "paradoxically" regarding such successful "mixed" socio-economic settings in order to steer clear of the persistently propagated cliché of claiming "ethnic homogeneity" as a progressive component behind economic growth; something which the case of Memel/Klaipėda falsifies in the interwar period – no denying its sequence of political conflicts during the same period, which ended with the *Anschluss* of Memeland to Nazi Germany in 1939.[9]

A dramatic impact was made by the First and especially the Second World War as the frontier of war and occupations, by the Red Army and

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7 M. Sobecki, "The Neman river," in W. Berg, ed., *Transcultural areas*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011, pp. 95–105; E. van Cleef, "East Baltic ports and boundaries: With special reference to Konigsberg," *Geographical Review* 35(2), 1945, pp. 260–1.

8 For overviews in English see D. Kirby, *Northern Europe in the early modern period: the Baltic World, 1492-1772*. London: Longman, 1990; and A. Kasekamp, *A history of the Baltic States*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; for a review of research see S.C. Rowell, "The face beneath the snow: The Baltic Region in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries," *The Historical Journal* 44(2), 2001, pp. 541–58.

9 D. Stevens, "The German problem in Memel," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 14(41), 1936, pp. 321–31; on the history-writings on the succession of "liberations" of this region, see V. Safronovas, "Identitätskonflikte, Symbolwerdung der Grabstätten und der Kult um die Befreier in Klaipėda/Memel des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Annaberger Annalen* 16, 2008, pp. 205–26.

that of Nazi Germany, passed this territory several times. The result was streams of refugees, genocide of the Jewish population, devastation of infrastructure, estates and traditions. This created bitter memories and many different histories to be told, listened to, acknowledged and mourned. At the end of the Second World War the remaining German population was deported from Memel/Klaipėda and all of former East Prussia and the Baltic states. Lithuania and its part of the Curonian Spit was turned into a Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union and remained as such until its reconstitution as a sovereign state in 1990.[10]

Thus this region contains, or rather consists in, a complex material and symbolic heritage, rich in border imagery and symbolism.[11] It presents many challenges to contemporary regional and city managers in terms of what sites to demolish and redevelop, what to maintain and restore, and what histories to mention in tourism information, and for operators to thematize in tour guides, and in branding and marketing.

Professional cultural studies of the Baltic Region and in Central Europe seem to indicate that cultural heritage managers and successful tourism developers alike do best in applying a kind of archaeological approach to local and regional history to get all layers in the cultural palimpsest visible.[12] Transparent priorities are needed for marketing, yet a rich and complex cultural heritage could be key in building prolonged fascination among visitors for a site or a region, making them keen to return. Good scholarship and ethically sustainability calls for awareness of differences of interests among present and former residents of a region, as also among its various groups of visitors. Of course heritage management resources are always limited and vested and capital interests are the prime movers of regional and city developments. Legislators and planners need to arrive at manageable projects, tourism outreach will have to be based on some choices, which may filter out some once important regimes and periods of the past that are still visible by traces in its built heritage.[13]

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[10] Overviews are in D. Kirby, *The Baltic world 1772-1993: Europe's Northern periphery in an age of change*. London: Longman, 1995; and A. Kasekamp, op. cit. A critique of the latter is in V. Safronovas, [Review of Kasekamp 2010]. *Lithuanian historical studies* 17, 2012, pp. 260–63; T. Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin.* London: Vintage, 2010; A. Eidintas, *Jews, Lithuanians and the Holocaust*. Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2003.

[11] D. Mačiulis, A. Nikžentaitis, V. Safronovas, "L'appropriation symbolique d'une ville multiculturelle: Les cas de Kaunas, Klaipėda et Vilnius," *Revue Germanique Internationale* 11, 2010, pp. 41–60; V. Davoliūtė, "Postwar reconstruction and the imperial sublime in Vilnius during late Stalinism," *Ab Imperio* (1), 2014, pp. 176–203.

[12] A. Huyssen, *Present pasts: urban palimpsests and the politics of memory.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

[13] This dilemma is further elaborated in e.g. M. Sirutavičius, "The Grand Duchy

One approach to counter the dilemma of inclusion/exclusion in heritage studies may be to apply the sometimes criticized format of the *landesgeschichte* (history of the land/county) – an established tradition in German history-writing which today seems rather close in practice to research along the lines of the more recently launched "spatial turn" in mainstream historical study.[14] By focusing a geographically defined reasonably small area, without initially relating it by some functional or organizational reasoning to a national, ethnical, regional or global socio-economic and political context, and by sticking at least initially to an attempt at a Rankean description of the sequence of events, regimes and occupations occurring in the location, we will increase our chances to arrive at a representative framework of what has "occurred on the land" without the usual omissions and biases.

This sounds perhaps like reinventing the old schoolmaster's *heimatskunde;* a school subject used in the past to rear youth in local and national shades of chauvinism, and the belief that local families of noble or more humble origin, given their ancestry, ownership or other apparent prerogatives to the land, have been the prime movers of everything important locally. Post-war *landesgeschichte* has also been criticized as lacking in reform with regards to its pre-war affiliation with national-socialistic ideology including the latter's so-called *völkischen* myths of history.[15] This is partly true also of Scandinavian rural history of the old *hembyggsdkunskap* style (a standard subject in the post-war Swedish primary school) ingrained as it were with geo-determinism and more than slightly tainted by colonial and other forms of racism.

Primordialism as an approach, its endless search for the true first-comers on any land, its neglect to acknowledge the productivity, value and rights of later immigrants, not to mention temporary settlers, and its obsession with ethnical identities and typologies, gets clearly vain in the setting of the borderland with its important cross-roads and often turbulent histories. Instead, as long as the place, with its time-sequence of material elements is kept in focus, and by avoiding geo-deterministic outlooks, an unprejudiced local approach will make possible a discourse that can move from archaeological evidence into e.g. styles in buildings and trends in omissions and lacunas in

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of Lithuania and the historical region: The search for new coordinates in post-Soviet Lithuanian historiography," E. Aleksandravičius, ed., *The construction of national narratives and politics of memory in the Central and Eastern European region after 1989*. Kaunas: Vytauto Didžiojo Universitetas & Versus Aureus, 2014, pp. 41–54.

14 W. Freitag, "Landesgeschichte als Synthese–Regionalgeschichte als Methode?" *Westfälische Forschungen* 54, 2005, pp. 291–305

15 W. Speitkamp, "Die deutschen Universitäten und die Landesgeschichte in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Revue d'Alsace* 133, 2007, pp. 435–49.

the cityscape or rural setting, to arrive at an inclusive and ethically sustainable narrative of the local heritage, and thus the tourism presentations made of it.

Based on field-studies in Smiltynė at the northern end of the Curonian Spit, and in Klaipėda the present author has discussed in more detail elsewhere the Klaipėda/Memel cityscape palimpsest of cultural and socioeconomic layers, including its lacunas and contested sites.[16] Relevant to our present topic there is today excellent scholarship to be found in the secondary literature by Lithuanian and other historians and sociologists, a fraction of which has been possible to refer to in this brief chapter. Targets for primary study especially of tourism can be found in already mentioned un-provoked sources on the Internet. Additional relevant materials can be found on-site in local tourism offices, information kiosks, information signs, etc.

The visitors industry of the Curonian Spit is as striking example of the fact that tourists may bring a heritage to a site based on their own background and interests. In Klaipeda and on the Spit many people of Jewish and German decent visit areas related to their own family's histories, significant of their traditions, this is dimly expressed or suppressed in local tourist guides and on websites on this part of Lithuania.[17] After five decades as part of the USSR and its planned economy the Soviet heritage of infrastructure is still prominent, it is of course identified and understood in different ways by various visitors and residents.[18]

There are similarities to be found in the developments after 1945 in Central Europe and in Subarctic Europe. Northern Finland and the Murmansk Region in Russia had been theatres of war. The scorched earth tactics and systematic demolition "program" practiced during the mostly un-forced retreat of the German occupation army as it moved west out of engagement with the Red Army, which resorted to secure the nearby harbor of Murmansk in Russia by occupying only the easternmost borderland of northern Norway, resulted in

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[16] U. Wråkberg, "Built heritage in the borderlands of the Barents and Baltic Regions: Post-Soviet spaces in Kirkenes, Pechenga and Klaipeda," in N. I. Kurganova, S.A. Vinogradova, E.A. Tyurkan, eds *Languages and culture in the Arctic region.* Murmansk: Murmansk State Humanities University, 2014, pp. 161–9; N. Kinossian, U. Wråkberg, "Palimpsests in the North European borderland: The border-aesthetics of post-Soviet space," J. Schimanski, S. Wolfe, eds, *Border Aesthetics: Concepts and Intersections*. London & New York: Berghahn Publishers, London & New York, 2017, pp. 90–110.

[17] Cf. A. Peleikis, "Reisen in die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Heimattouristen auf der Kurischen Nehrung." *Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis* XIX: *Studia Anthropologica* III, 2009, pp. 115–129; M. M. Gans, "'Reunion:' reclaiming Baltic Jewry, creating study tours to the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and Israel." Available online: yad-vashem.org.il/yv/en/education/conference/2004/45.pdf (accessed on August 1, 2016).

[18] U. Wråkberg, op. cit., 2014; about 6 per cent of Lithuania's citizen are today Polish speaking and about as many are of Russian/Soviet origin.

a devastation of infrastructure and housing which was among the worst/most complete/ in Europe in material terms. Of some 70,000 of the total population in this sparsely populated part of Norway 50,000 people were forced into evacuation by the German troops and sent west and south to be housed in middle and southern Norway. These people were mainly fishermen, Sami costal dwellers and reindeer herders. Others were state officials and industrial managers and laborers. They were able to return to start rebuild their homes after the peace in 1945, given that the Norwegian state moved swiftly to control this socio-economic process. Access to the land was hampered as sea-based transport was the only way to get supplies far north and all harbors had to be restored. Roads were few, and had been badly damaged; railways were never built as far as to northern Norway.[19]

Norway was spared any Stalinist seizures of territory and the political infiltration of the kind leading to the formation of the East Bloc of Central and Easter Europe. The Red Army units which in October 1944 liberated and then occupied the easternmost part of Finnmark was suddenly order back to Russia in the fall of 1945. Finland lost some portions of its territory in the separate settlement of peace with the Soviet Union, it stayed neutral as Sweden during the Cold War, while Norway joined NATO in 1949. Certain demographic change got permanent also in the Euro-Arctic: forced movements of small populations took place after the war foremost of which was the evacuation of the Finnish and East Sámi population out of the pre-war Finnish territory around Pechenga, close to the border of Norway. This process is seldom mentioned today and mainly invisible to tourists, one exception being its presentation in the exhibitions of the Siida national museum of the Sámi indigenous people in the Finnish town of Inari.[20]

The present author has argued elsewhere that the standardized monotony of the modernist housing that was constructed in Finnmark County in the forties and fiftieths was the result of a strict top-down governmental control imposed on the entire rebuilding process.[21] It ignored Sami traditions and any other local pre-war heritage in its technocratic village layouts and in the style of the housing. The re-building schemes were based on national Norwegian subsidies that were as such both necessary and welcome. This "reconstruction" follows the pattern of the pre-war so-called Norwegianization policy of North-Eastern Norway[22] which had for long regarded its borderland, with its age-old cultural and ethnic cross-

[19] D.H. Lund, "The revival of northern Norway," *The Geographical Journal* 109(4/6), 1947, pp. 185–97.

[20] Siida Sami Museum" From Petsamo to Inari, 2003. Available online: www.samimuseum.fi/saamjiellem/english/historia.html (accessed on August 3, 2016).

[21] U. Wråkberg, 2015, op. cit.

[22] K. E. Eriksen, E. Niemi, *Den Finske Fare: Sikkerhetsproblemer og Minoritetspolitikk i Nord 1860-1940*. Oslo, Bergen & Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1981.

roads with Finland and Russia, as a national security risk. Viewed from the capital of Oslo and the point of view of Norwegian foreign policy it remained a cultural and military liability also after WWII.

The poor and anonymous character of the housing built in Finnmark County in the post-war decades is sometimes discussed locally today but has never been acknowledged officially. No revival of Finnmark built cultural heritage has been suggested as part of public policy, nor has it been undertaken to date. This stands in contrast to lively debates on city planning regarding most other places devastated by the war in Europe.[23] It partly explains the lack of interest, on behalf of the present owners of this post-war real-estate, to invest in its maintenance. Its resulting poor state of maintenance, and the fact that it is centrally situated in most Finnmark villages, worsens its humdrum impact. It is often commented negatively by visitors, and thus, if nothing else, it hampers local tourism.

A transfer of experiences and insights in the opposite direction, from the borderland of Subarctic Europe to that of the Curonian Spit, may be of interest while discussing best practices in managing nature reserves, especially such that straddles national borders. In northern Scandinavia and NW Russia there are since long established several large national parks, one of these is situated across and on both sides of the Pasvik River, which defines the national border between Norway-Russia. Local citizens' experiences of national parks is profound given that the Euro-Arctic is endowed with several of them and some are large such as the Urho Kekkonen National Park in northernmost Finland which by its 2,500 square km is fourteen times the area of the national park on the Curonian Spit, and equal to a sixth of the territory of the Kaliningradskaya Oblast.

Outdoor recreation is big among residents in northern Fennoscandia and conflicts of interest over land-uses are frequently expressed at on-line forums and in local newspapers. In general those regarding nature/national parks are about finding the balance between any park's role as a recreational area and as an exclusive sanctuary for nature. Emphasizing the latter the park may have its access limited to park rangers and natural scientists – after due evaluation of the scientist's relevant field-research project. Local residents with outdoor recreation as hobby or part of their informal economy, and tour operators' and their customers, will lobby against this – as long as there are any (left), one might need to add in the sparsely populated north.

In the Euro-Arctic the regulation and governance of nature reserves have been inclusive per se in trying to strike a balance between traditional indigenous land-uses, forestry, local settlers' interest of recreation, the tourism industry, and in some spots the mineral industry with its specific

[23] See e.g. J. M. Diefendorf, ed., *Rebuilding Europe's bombed cities.* London: Macmillan, 1990.

environmental impact. But there has also been important central policies operational; in Sweden e.g. in the shape of the *Riksintresse* – a superior national security and utilitarian concern often called upon in arbitration on major land-use conflicts.

Does the scientific/scholarly hybrid research approach of "radical human ecology" provide us with a way forward in analyzing conflicts of this kind? This seems doubtful deeming from what Ullrich Kockel[24] has to say in this tradition on the different ways land-uses and heritage preservation on the Curonian Spit and its World Heritage park has been handled, comparing the Kaliningrad management of the Russian part with its Lithuania counterpart, in his 2012 article on the matter. Matching Kockel's exposition against the business-oriented outlooks and job-generating examples on tourism development projects on the Spit presented by Belova and Kropinova in 2015 it is clear that the latter scholar's approach has more in common than Kockel with the political majority in Norway today in their take on issues of use and protection of national parks.

Kockel's application of radical human ecology on the cultural heritage of the Curonian Spit fails to reveal some rather apparent problems. He doesn't find anything problematic in the imbalance in purchasing power between most other actors and the "returning" German tourists who visit this coastal region with or without a family background on the land. In obvious contrast to most other stakeholders involved, the latter possess the financial means to buy historic real estate, and thus are able to articulate their local interests very well. They are/have been equaled only by Russian investors. The latter are, in spite of the fact of the Russian jurisdiction on the southern end of the peninsula, disregarded in Kockel's treatise as commercialized and somehow unable to manage the regions heritage properly. Any plans for new tourism establishments to open for larger and broader groups of visitors remain just problematic in this kind of perspective.

Simplistic and biased attempts at analysis of land-uses and tourism are often found in the per se commendable free and democratic but endless local debates in northern Norway. Consensus is seldom found locally nor regionally so the required final words to get on with many matters have a tendency to come from the all-powerful government ministries residing far south in the national capital Oslo. Proposed openings or changes in the access for winter tourists to off-road snow-scooter-driving, for angling, not to mention hunting, are all debated in local newspapers and on Facebook pages.[25] The stance of the political majority has turned somewhat more

[24] U. Kockel, "Borders, European integration and UNESCO World Heritage: A case study of the Curonian Spit," in R.F. Bendix, A. Eggert, A. Peselmann, eds, *Heritage Regimes and the State*, [Göttingen studies in cultural property, no. 6] Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2012, pp. 227–46.

[25] For a recent example see the newspaper report by A. Renslo Sandvik, "Vurderer

in recent years towards promoting tourism business interests. Public governance now tend to favor tourism operators' interest to open routes and areas to their customers over the interests of nature preservationists. It is not uncommon in northern Scandinavia that local residents go against expanding national parks as experience are that such enlargements and additions will not add opportunities for more people to make a living from the land.

There is a need for more scholarship on the construction and meaning of local cultural heritage. It need to be produced by internationally accepted methods, placed in context, and its ethical implications must be recognized. Only this way is quality tourism attainable with minimized bias in representations of local culture and history. Better balanced tours with an inclusive variety of events will attract new groups and more visitors. The quest for the cliché of the exclusive, life-altering "authentic" tourism experience, of e.g. untouched wilderness or primordial traditional living, is rife to swap for respectful tourism as part of a cosmopolitan approach to share cultural heritage among us all, as citizens of the world.[26] Such an outlook has the potential to engage more tourists from near and afar by providing inspiration and fascination with local cultural variety found anywhere, combining this with an interest for parallels between human cultures over time and in different places.

Borderland comparison II: Transcarpathia

Another example of Europe's multifaceted borderlands can be found in the region of Transcarpathia, which today forms the westernmost part of Ukraine. The present author, as fellow of the Department of Tourism and Northern Studies of UiT the Arctic University of Norway, is consultative partner in a so-called EEA Norway Grant funded Slovak–Ukrainian development project aiming among other to promote tourism in this borderland region. Our role in this is mainly to provide ideas and to conduct research on the ways this region's cultural heritage is and will be presented to attract and inform tourism. Transcarpathia has previously been part of

fartsgrense på 30 km/t, rasteforbud og påskestengt: Ser flere potensielle løypekonflikter," *Finnmarken* 118(191), August 20, 2016, pp. 4–6.

[26] K.A. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers*. London: W.W. Norton, 2007.

most of its present neighboring countries. It is situated at a junction between five states: Ukraine – to which it now belongs, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. It has a large minority of Roma and the exclusive Rusyn or Ruthene people; in pre-war times German and Jewish minorities were considerable, the latter comprised some 12–13 per cent of the population in the inter-war period. In economic terms Slovakia and Hungary are today the most important of Transcarpathia's neighbors.[27]

When integrated in the USSR after 1945 (as part of the Ukrainian SSR) Transcarpathia entered into the typical state of most Stalinist post-WWII land-seizures: like the Curonian Spit it was heavily militarized in several spots, as some kind of spearhead against Western and Central Europe, but largely the land was wasted for development, locked into restricted security zones including a few exclusive vacation sites open for party dignitaries. This state of affairs in Transcarpathia ended when the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR declared independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991.

In the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea the permeability of the Schengen-borders of Transcarpathia towards Ukraine's western neighbors has grown in importance. Because the domestically popular Azov sea-side has shrunk in importance, due to the war in nearby Donbas, an increased domestic interests for Transcarpathia can be foreseen, given the attraction of other more established "non-Crimean" tourist's spots in Ukraine such as Kiev and the Carpathians – further north-east of Transcarpathia. Nevertheless increased West and Central European tourism would be most important for Ukraine from a macroeconomic point of view.[28]

During Soviet times some labour union recreational resorts and Russian styled sanatoria rest-homes were established in the mountains and forested mainland of Transcarpathia. Investments and input of ideas and entrepreneurship have been made in these of late to get facilities and local visiting programs competitive on the European tourism market. Given that Transcarpathia once was regarded the middle of Europe (among many candidates promoted on various occasions for this odd status) it is often presently referred to as one of its peripheries.[29] A comparison with

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[27] P. Jordan, M. Klemenčić, "Transcarpathia—bridgehead or periphery?," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 44(7), 2003, pp. 497–513.

[28] Cf Y. Silina, "Mariupol: The tourist spot that war is killing," 2015. Available online: www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/the-tourist-spot-that-war-is-killing/news-story/27a66d285331bdb3a4a3ab99b130bccc (accessed on August 3, 2016); S. Berghauer, L. Gyuricza, "The role of the borderland position in the tourism of Transcarpathia." *Geographica Timesiensis* 20(1), 2011, pp. 47–57.

[29] J. Batt, "Transcarpathia: Peripheral region at the 'Centre of Europe,'" *Regional & Federal Studies*, 12(2), 2002, pp. 155–77.

Subarctic Scandinavia may help in reminding that Transcarpathia, given its standard of roads, is within a day-trip or two by car from several countries with major tourism generating markets.

As mentioned, efficient passage of the Schengen custom stations with Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are crucial to Transcarpathia and Ukraine as a whole. Nevertheless in Central European and Western popular media, if Transcarpathia is mentioned at all, it tends to be portrayed as some picturesque and forgotten backwoods of Europe.[30] Reasonable or not this old imagery fascinates and drives a considerable number of tourists to the region. Professional analysts have so far recommended further raising the service-conscience and professionalism among operators, and more investments. Optimism is tempered in pointing out the level of competition in the European rural segment, while marketing ideas consist in a rather standard approach of promoting charming mountain villages, old fortresses and castles (mostly after the Hungarian landed gentry), and rural authenticity – whatever it is – catering to the persistent interest for it among many tourists. Ecotourism is here as elsewhere in the world put forward as the modernisation needed to apply by operators and at local establishments in order to attract additional groups of resourceful West-European tourists to the region.[31]

One may add from a North-European perspective, considering the hampering effects on tourism of the Scandinavian, esp. Norwegian high levels of costs, that there is a given possibility to attract tourists to Transcarpathia based on good prices – again provided that accommodation and gastronomy reach a level acceptable to most visitors which is certainly within reach, if not already a fact. Cross-border shopping, involving mainly nearby areas of the neighboring countries, is important in Transcarpathia, and this is also the case in the northern Norwegian–Russian–Finnish borderland. As always, border-trade terms are mentioned as good as long as the exchange rates of the currencies involved seem favorable from the point of interest of the one doing the observation. The fall in global prices of oil and gas in recent years, and the ensuing drop in the value of the Rouble, has caused a down-turn in Russian border-shopping and trade with Finland

[30] For example, in the German TV documentary touching on the Bieszczady mountain and lake district on the Polish side of the border to Transcarpathia: U. Adrian, [documentary film-maker] "Kleiner Grenzverkehr: Polen und seine Nachbarn," (television broadcast) April 6, 2015, *WDR Fernsehen*, Köln. Available online: www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUh5ygzDTwg (accessed on August 4, 2016).

[31] S. Berghauer, L. Gyuricza, op. cit.; P. Jordan, "Transcarpathia – Ukrainian border region at the edge of the EU: Internal and external representations," *ISPRS/IGU/ICA Joint Workshop on Borderlands Modelling and Understanding for Global Sustainability*, December 5–6, 2013, Beijing, pp. 83–7.

and Norway. Compared with the Norwegian and Finnish Schengen borders with Russia, the custom and visa routines for entry and departure of Ukraine's Transcarpathia should have a greater potential to be streamlined in the near future based on political motivation among all national partners involved.

Transcarpathia exhibits a complex history under a succession of many lords. Several aspects of its political reality are generally instructive to look into for anyone interested in understanding cultural heritage and tourism. This includes the on-going historiographical debate (with political implications) over Transcarpathia's Christianization. It is argued by Carpatho–Russian/Rusyn activists to have begun as early as in 863, pre-dating the acceptance of Christianity even in Kyiv, and would make Transcarpathia the cradle of East Slav Orthodoxy. This so-far disputed research has been conducted by various diaspora Ukrainian and other historians. It has implications for how to describe Ukraine, its cultural context and character as a whole.

The historiography of Ukraine has evolved, according to a pattern typical of many other parts of Europe, from a standard nationalist approach, via ethnonational and multi-ethnic history-writings,[32] followed by a critique of the teleology of all primordialism and its marginalization of non-ethnic groups and institutions, into a tentative transnational outlook.[33] Of particular interest to heritage studies of borderlands is the potential expansion of our understanding of such regions from that of peripheries along frozen or moving frontiers, with a few odd and inefficient border-crossing stations, into seeing their potential or actual function as multidimensional contact zones, cross-roads where many kinds of cultural assemblages have been transferred. This has not only happened by migration and invasions, but by transfer between peacefully communicating individuals and groups. Thus immaterial but very important entities, such as religious confessions, moral values, codes of conduct, ways of making business, political ideas, taste, fashion, science, capitalism, technologies, can and do have transferred by moving ideas on the cross-roads of borderlands; and not always by travelling individuals, but by setting examples, establishing partnerships, emulating institutional structures – without these necessarily being tied to specific national or ethnic groups.

The active debate over the strategy of various members of the Ruthene minority in Transcarpathia is also of general interest to borderland study. Many of this group reveal today a disenchantment with, and pragmatism

[32] P. R. Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996..

[33] S. Plokhy, "Between history and nation: Paul Robert Magocsi and the rewriting of Ukrainian history," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 39(1), 2011, pp. 117–24; A. Applebaum, The victory of Ukraine. *The New York Review of Books* 63(6), 2016, pp. 74–6.

towards, the academically assisted, but never settled issue of their ethnic identity. Discrimination on the basis of any conceivable individual or group characteristic is a sadly abundant crime committed against many humans all over the world, yet when somebody's identity, anyhow conceived, is not manifest by discrimination, who has the right to ask them to step out to identify as "others?" Apart from the pride and joy often declared by those experienced of presenting their individual characteristics or group identification openly, political pressures have often been applied on groups, in the past as well as today, "to identify themselves" in line with nationalist agendas conceived by others, often based on ideas of ethnic essentialism. Individuals and groups are made into political instruments in power struggles, denying the same individuals the right to try to pursue a good life and peaceful career in the social systems they have at hand, or chose to enter. Many in the Ruthene minority of Transcarpathia have demonstrated distrust towards entering political processes with unclear winners and endings. As Judy Blatt has contended: "Multiple identity has been an invaluable means of survival in the face of invading armies and bureaucrats from states that have successively bludgeoned Transcarpathians into ill-fitting national categories."[34]

In the borderlands of northern Fennoscandia and NW Russia, intermarriages have since long been common among Norwegians, Finns, Sami, Russians and nowadays Thai-people. Many of them were and are bilingual. For some time during the heydays of the so-called Pomor cross-border trade there was developed a now extinct Russian-Norwegian pidgin-language *Moja-pa-tvoja* or *Russenorsk*. Transcarpathian minorities' local practices problematize the standard idea of citizens' identity-seeking based on ethnicity. The supposed universality of a human yearn to manifest your uniqueness may in any real and unequal society destine some to commit time and effort to a cultural-historical heritage which will offer the individual a limited platform, compared to that of the majority society, to pursue his or her particular ambitions and choice of livelihood. Ethno-political movements have been largely successful in the North-Scandinavian setting in opening flexibility for individuals to manifest a composite ethnicity, by e.g. moving between different social spheres, while denying indigeneity as a stigma of origin in a family's past.[35]

As a side-effect of rural city group's denial of ethnic conservatism the standard tourist endeavor of seeking the unaltered authentic rurality needs some rethinking. In Scandinavia this runs into a rather pressing conflict over whether such a seemingly voluntary choice of manifesting an identity

[34] J. Batt, op. cit., p. 156.

[35] K. Olsen, "When ethnic identity is a private matter," *Journal of Ethnology and Folkloristics* 1(1), 2007, pp. 75–99.

is in fact "assimilation" in the majority community – a politically very negatively loaded term. Judging by public debate in northern Norway it remains unclear if the choice to deny ethnic labelling is "acceptable" to the liberal and learned minds of present society. From an academic stand-point of course such an act can just be declared void, genealogical research can always put an ethnical label one anyone against his or her will.

Nevertheless voluntary assimilation is a phenomenon out there among apparently happy people, and as is very well known they may uphold and live by parts of their traditions, privately or publicly, dependent on their motivation, time and economic means. Indigenous people in northern Scandinavia subsisting by the traditional livelihoods of reindeer herding have since long themselves modernized their life-style by e.g. innovatively integrating modern technology in their business. There are also many instances by now of such indigenous entrepreneurs who developed tourist events to which visitors are invited to familiarize themselves with viable examples of traditional living in contemporary society.

Tourism and cultural heritage in the Russo–Scandinavian Subarctic

Based on the present author's experience as guide on a few Arctic cruises most tourists are curious and fascinated about many things. Few have only one hobby-interest that caused them to join the trip and wouldn't like to be distracted by any other kind of perspectives or anecdotes on the north. It is rather a matter of academic infighting over turfs and the control of teaching programs that has led to the idea that a certain limited teaching curricula is sufficient for training tourist operators who are, by this limitation in scope, also supposed to only be active in the Subarctic and Arctic region during their future professional career.

In contemporary Norway this has placed business-management and a nature oriented content scope (based in practice on taken-for-granted popular science) as the center pieces of course packages on offer and under development. If anything else should be necessary to bring into the picture it has sometimes been attempted by quick fix; an hour or two by a quest lecturer on e.g. "the history of polar exploration." More heed has been taken lately to bring indigenous northern cultures into the picture, but if reasonable time is not devoted to its ethical side and several complex

matters, including those of traditional knowledge-systems of nature, it also risks getting stereotypical and may cause tourism operators thus trained professional problems later. The often stated need for ecological sustainability in northern tourism should be added a component of cultural sustainability in the ethical sense discussed in this chapter, this seems to be corroborated by experiences of nature-culture tourism globally.[36]

There are reasons to keep cultural and heritage study central in the scope of course-programs of northern tourism management deriving from the practicalities of focusing Arctic natural phenomena. Many of those now high on the wish-list of tourists are elusive and unreliable occurrences such as the aurora, or the objects for bird- and whale-watching. All operators of such tours know this already and have some plan-B for the tourists when there is a "no-show" of the exotic nature marvel. Such alternative tour content should of course be good quality; up-to-date popular science regarding the phenomena, its history of science and folklore. There is a lot to gain by drawing your knowledge from cutting-edge course contents and to promote partnership with the university sector in getting materials reliable, rich and fascinating.

As discussed in this chapter, the ideas of finding genuine rurality in some forgotten backwoods of Europe, or in the pristine wilderness of its remote Subarctic, continue to drive visitor's interests towards certain parts of central and northernmost Europe. This is important on some tourism markets and could be catered to in a sustainable way in terms of ecology, minorities' interests and up-to-date interpretations of culture heritage.

A more modern "attraction" of the Arctic environment is that it may somehow go extinct. The sinister side of this attract dark tourism to frightening post-Soviet industrial sites and mines in the Russian borderland with northern Norway and Finland.[37] The visitors who come to marvel over this may however come across images and presentations in local Russian museums and in guided-tours, which depict in appreciative terms the old Soviet project of building a good life up-north for the heroic socialist laborer. It is often news to the Western urban visitor to learn that employment in this industry is still the main alternative to make a living in Subarctic Russia for those remaining there after massive out-migration

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[36] B. McKercher, H. Du Cros, *Cultural tourism: the partnership between tourism and cultural heritage management.* New York, London & Oxford: The Haworth Hospitality Press, 2002; D. Gillman, *The idea of cultural heritage*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010 (2nd. rev. ed.); B. Graham, G.J. Ashworth, J.E. Tunbridge, *A geography of heritage: power, culture, and economy.* London: Hodder Arnold, 2000.

[37] On dark tourism see e.g. R. Sharpley, P. Stone, eds, *The darker side of travel: the theory and practice of dark tourism.* Tonawanda: Channel View Publications, 2009.

since the 1990s. According to the present writer, properly guided and discussed, such puzzling confrontations can turn into deeply interesting experiences for the open-minded traveler. To view our understanding of nature as cultural and contextual, and less as givens, will serve tourism developers well everywhere.

There may be a thing or two of general interest to Central European tourism management in the experiences of its counterpart in the Euro-Arctic. The Barents Euro-Arctic regional cooperation for one (involving the north-western oblasts of Russia and northern Sweden, Norway and Finland) has continued since its beginnings in the 1990s to function as a platform for cultural and scholarly partnerships as well as for grass-root people-to-people undertakings among schools, public institutions and at least until recently, among NGOs in all member countries.[38] Tourism development has played a considerable role in this. Another example from the north, but with a mixed message, consists in the difficulties of harmonizing group interests into business-minded compromises between various promoters and user of nature parks. Experiences goes back a long time in the north, properly analyzed and communicated these may be instructive for anyone seeking a balanced "pro"-attitude towards simplistic and single-minded ideals of just expanding nature reserves in numbers and size.

In historical perspective, and in the other extreme of governance, the industry frontier conception of the Subarctic has bestowed its borderlands with a northern vertical in directing political and economic interests towards potential natural resources on Arctic islands and on the continental shelves of the Barents, Kara and Pechora Seas. The Exclusive Economic Zones of the artic costal states, of which only the large Norwegian one is fully settled today, are constantly discussed in popular and specialist media. Until the first decade of the 20th century international interests were focused on the attainment of the North Pole. In the early decades of the Cold War cross-pole military frontiers were envisioned and Arctic war scenarios a constant preoccupation.[39] This recent history and contemporary geo-economics fascinates not all but several northern tourists today. A reconceptualization of the European Subarctic as a cross-road can be inspired by familiarity with e.g. the region of Transcarpathia in Central Europe, by considering

[38] P. Haugseth, "Tvillingbysamarbeid i den norsk-russiske grensesonen," in A. Viken, B.S. Fors, eds, *Grenseliv.* Stamsund: Orkana akademisk forlag, 2014, pp. 21–37; H. Tjelmeland, "Border as barrier and bridge: The Norwegian-Soviet/Russian border as a political and cultural construction," in K. Katajala, M. Lähteenmäki, eds, *Imagined, negotiated, remembered: constructing European borders and borderlands.* Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012, pp. 167–86.

[39] R.E. Doel, R.M. Friedman, J. Lajus, S. Sörlin, U. Wråkberg, "Strategic Arctic science: National interests in building natural knowledge – Interwar era through the Cold War," *Journal of Historical Geography* 44, April 2014, pp. 60–80.

a *landesgeschichte* perspective on Ukraine as discussed above, and the way the entire European-Asian geographical nexus has functioned through the ages.

Regarding the high north as a cross-road for movement of ideas and ambitions from east to west as well as between north to south makes it easier to see also the rationale behind scientific international networking and coordinated field-research up-north. The earliest examples are found in the joint research programs of the multinational First International Polar Year in 1882–1883 which was proposed by the Austro–Hungarian naval officer and scientists Karl Weyprecht. Several countries participated including Sweden–Norway, Russia, Germany, USA, the Austro–Hungarian Empire. They all funded and established polar research station on something which looked as frontiers on the central Arctic but which was in reality a platform of knowledge production based on open scientific exchange. This is one example of what is research-wise motivated to present to any person interested in the high north to balance the standard Arctic alarmism of contemporary journalism which conjure up images of clashing global business conglomerates and nations embroiled in eternal realist geopolitical struggle over a defreezing Arctic world of hidden strategic resources.[40]

Given contemporary challenges in European–Russian relations regarding memorials and heritage sites, the suppression or acknowledgement of post-Soviet heritage in the management of real-estate and certain infrastructure, have been variously handled in borderland tourism in the e.g. Baltic States and in the Euro-Arctic.[41]

The Arctic islands of Svalbard, where some 2500 people live today were once a *terra communis* but belongs since 1920 to Norway. The largest groups of nationals residing on the islands are presently Norwegians, Russians and Ukrainians. It is governed under the special Spitsbergen treaty which opens for business activities including tourism on an equal opportunity basis for entrepreneurs from all signatory nations. Here day-trip cruises to an abandoned Soviet mining ghost town called Pyramiden draw large numbers of visitors.[42] They are fascinated vaguely by the site's massive post-Soviet reminiscences, helped by casual and/or humorous guide-work – on those occasions when the present writer has visited there along with tourists.

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[40] R. E. Doel, U. Wråkberg, S. Zeller, "Science, environment, and the new Arctic," *Journal of Historical Geography* 44, April 2014, pp. 1–13.

[41] Cf. on the former the 2008 thematic issue 39(4) of the *Journal of Baltic Studies* on the clash of interest over the *Bronze Soldier* war memorial in Tallinn, including also reflections by A. Weiss-Wendt, "Why the holocaust does not matter to Estonians," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39(4), 2008, pp. 475–97 on how memories of the Holocaust had until then evaded public interest in Estonia.

[42] E. Andreassen, H.B. Bjerck, B. Olsen, *Persistent memories: Pyramiden - a Soviet mining town in the High Arctic.* Trondheim: Tapir Academic Press, 2010.

As a relieving contrast to tensions elsewhere this may all be very nice but leaving heritage meanings completely open to the visitors may in other settings than the cool and windy islands of Svalbard cause frustrations, be untenable as part of responsible guide-work and prone to produce political complications in one way or the other.

Many examples can be found where the study of built heritage has played positively into, and received feed-back from, property developers, tourism entrepreneur, and in the media coverage on the site in question. One such may be found at the southern end of the Curonian Spit in the recent German-Russian joint endeavors to reconstruct the social, cultural and built heritage of Kaliningrad, formerly Königsberg of East–Prussia. It seems to have been possible to arrive at both a well-informed and relaxed outlook on the local composite heritage and to use this as a basis for joint restorative work on Kaliningrad's remaining old buildings: the cathedral, the memorial and tomb of Immanuel Kant. This entails acknowledging a past almost eradicated during Soviet times, while simultaneously jointly providing as a result something interesting to show to expanding numbers of tourist new to the region, greeting also former inhabitants and their descendants welcome.[43]

Pierre Nora's concept *lieux de mémoire* "memory place/space" has had profound influence in recent years. Nora's reasoning is targeted at his conceived problem of upholding "Frenchness," or French collective identity, and how this act of preservation of the French nation can be furthered by commemorations in certain, singular places, but not in a coherent framework of space and time.[44] Nora's discourse, which is not claimed to

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[43] Such a stance is found e.g. in the Russian and German TV documentaries by A. Somov, [director] "Discovering Russia with James Brown: The Kaliningrad region," (net television) September 23, 2013, *Russia Today & TV Novosti*, Moscow. Available online: rtd.rt.com/films/james-brown-kaliningrad-region/ (accessed on August 4, 2016); S. Kühnrich, [documentary film-maker], "Kaliningrad/Königsberg: Eine Deutsch-Russische Versöhnungsgeschichte." (television broadcast) January 24, 2010, *LE Vision Film- und Fernsehproduktion GmbH for MDR: Mitteldeutschen Rundfunk*, Leipzig. Available online: www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2a9pjSGTTQ (accessed on August 4, 2016); and C. Claus, H. Adam, [producers] "Meine Heimat–Deine Heimat: Mit Wolf von Lojewski durch Ostpreußen, part 2: Kaliningrader Klopse," 2008 (net television) *ZDF: Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, Mainz*. Available online: www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1UoxYSqMzU (accessed on August 4, 2016).; cf. C.S. Browning, P. Joenniemi, "The identity of Kaliningrad: Russian, European or a third space?" in F. Tassinari, ed., *The Baltic Sea Region in the European Union: reflections on identity, soft-security and marginality.* Gdańsk & Berlin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego & Nordeuropa-Institut der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2003, pp. 58–103.

[44] P. Nora, ed., *Realms of Memory*. 2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; J. Hackmann, "Collective memories in the Baltic Sea region and beyond:

be scholarly founded by its originator, has interestingly cached on in many quarters not least outside of France and led to attempts to transfer and apply it in new settings. Building or creating national identity among people of the suitable/receptive kind by visits to certain sites, is nevertheless an old idea practiced since centuries.

Destinations supposed to be more ingrained than others with Swedish "national spirit," such as the County of Dalecarlia in middle Sweden with strong folklore traditions, have been recommended to visitors since the nineteenth century. This county, and in particular its villages Leksand and Rättvik, were regarded worth visiting in order to have some kind of monolithic experience of pre-industrial Swedish society, as an antidote to living by the empty business-values of the modern city. It is perhaps the enthusiasm to launch sites originally conceived in this national romantic tradition into international tourism that is the most surprising of all that which is unclear in these enactments. Even though a rich historic and folkloristic experience may be open to most visitors being well guided in a rural setting, its transfer of supposed "Swedishness" seems void of meaning to all those defined as outsiders in the construction of that national exclusivity, as xenophobia in practice remained a central component of the entire project; particularly so if the concept of nation is transferred uncritically from 19th-century nationalism.[45]

If not well-versed in the discourse and background of Pierre Nora and his interpretations of cultural heritage, tourism developers may run into problems of interpreting memory spaces for themselves and others. It is also in general not obvious what meanings often visited and marketed sites such as war memorials are supposed to have to visitors from near or afar. It takes good guide-work and open-mindedness among visitors to find a cosmopolitan and peaceful meaning in this class of sites, especially as precisely the general human meaning is so often denied by the same schools of thoughts that conceived of the sites and their paraphernalia in the first place.

How can, and why should, the visiting outsider try to relate to anyone defined as inherently special and different, comprehensible only to his own circle of peers? It is mind-opening to test the very different view of the borderland citizen as an expert in cross-cultural communication. Arguably a tolerant, business minded, go-between "identity" can be found

National–Transnational–European?" *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39(4), 2008, pp. 381–91; A. Rigney, "Plenitude, scarcity and the circulation of cultural memory," *Journal of European Studies* 35(1), 2005, pp. 11–28.

[45] A. Olsson, "The image of Sweden in textbooks within the subject of tourism in upper secondary school," 17th Nordic Symposium in Tourism & Hospitality Research, September 25–28, 2008, Lillehammer, Norway. Available online: www.northors.aau.dk/papers/ (accessed on August 4, 2016).

in borderlands, which comes from living in and off a region of cultural interchange – of cross-roads – where facilitating brokerage by language and cultural skills is a way of life resulting in an identity of openness? Such a view calls for revisions in several historiographies and for a multifaceted understanding of heritage.

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